In a new disclosure made public ahead of the NSG meeting in Vienna, a US Congressman has revealed that the Bush administration told the US Congress the US will not sell sensitive nuclear technologies to India and would terminate nuclear trade if New Delhi conducted a nuclear test, according to a report.

The Bush administration told this to the US Congress in correspondence that has remained secret for nine months, but which was made public only on Tuesday by Representative Howard L Berman, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, The Washington Post reported.

The disclosure seems to contradict the Bush administration's stated intention to push for a clean waiver in the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) when it begins its two-day conclave in Vienna on Thursday to consider a revised draft to exempt India from the rules of global nuclear commerce.

The questions were submitted to the State Department by Berman's predecessor Tom Lantos way back in October 2007 and answers were sent on January 16, 2008.

"The answers were considered so sensitive, particularly because the debate over the agreement in India could have toppled the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the State Department requested they remain secret even though they were not classified," according to the Washington Post which quoted a spokesman for Berman as saying he had made the answers public because the US Congress must have "relevant information".

Berman recently wrote a letter to the US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in which he threatened that the deal will be blocked in the US Congress if the Bush Administration does not incorporate additional conditionalties in any NSG waiver to India.

In its responses, the State Department has said that as outlined in the 123 Agreement, should India detonate a nuclear explosive device, the US has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation with it immediately, including the supply of fuel.

It also stipulates that US can request India to return items transferred from it including fresh fuel. In addition, the US has the right to termiante the agreement on one year's written notice.

Closely guarded fact

The State Department letter says the US assurances are intended to guard against disruptions of fuel supply to India that might occur through no fault of its own.

It cited instances like a trade war resulting in the cut off supply, market disruptions or the failure of a company to fulfill a fuel supply contract.

In such circumstances, the US would be prepared to encourage transfers of nuclear fuel to India by other NSG members.

"The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments," the State Department said.

The State Department also took the line that ceasing nuclear coopeation with India would be a "serious step."

"The US would not take such a serious step without careful consideration of the circumstances necessitating such actions and the effects and impacts it would entail," it said.

Such circumstances would include detonation of a nuclear weapon, violation of the 123 Agreement or termination, abrogation or violation of the IAEA safeguards.

The State Department contended that although the Hyde Act allows for transfers of sensitive nuclear technology under certain circumstances, it was not the intention of the Administration to do this "outside" the deal.

It insisted that there was no plan or intention to negotiate an amendment to the proposed agreement to transfer to India sensitive nuclear facilities or critical components of such facilities.

The Department was asked whether US would limit any transfer of dual use technology to India's enrichment and reprocessing facilities to those that were participants in a bilateral or multinational programme to develop proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies.

In its response, the Administration said it was not its intention to assist India in the design, construction or
operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items "whether under the agreement or outside the agreement."

If India were to develop such facilities, potential dual-use transfers could be considered only under the exceptions granted in the Hyde Act, it said.

It said the US has not discussed in detail with India what form "appropriate verfication measures" might take if the IAEA decides that it was no longer possible for it to apply safeguards under the Indo-US agreeemnt.